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As outrageous as it is that so much incorrect science has been and still is being
used in the scientific, medical and bioethics literature to argue that fetal
"personhood" does not arrive until some magical biological marker event during
human embryological development, now we can witness the "new wave"
consequences of passively allowing such incorrect "new age" science to be
published and eventually accepted by professionals and non-professionals alike.
Once these scientifically erroneous claims, and the erroneoliS philosophical and
theological concepts they engender, are successfully imbedded in these bodies of
literature and in our collective consciousnesses, the next logical step is to imbed
them in our text books, reference materials and federal regulations.
Such is the case with the latest fifth edition of a highly respected embryology
text book by Keith Moore - The Developing Human. 1 This text is used in most
medical schools and graduate biology departments here, and in many institutions
abroad. Several definitions and redefinitions of scientific terms it uses are
incorporated, it would seem, in order to support the "new age" political agenda of
abortion and fetal research. Indeed, this embryology text book actually explicitly
engages in abortion counseling - a quite inappropriate use of a basic scientific text
book - and uses these incorrectly defined scientific terms to ground and justify its
conclusions about the "scientific correctness" of abortion. What is often not
realized is that these redefinitions would justify fetal research as well. Of particular
concern is Moore's sudden use of the scientifically erroneous term "pre-embryo"
in his most recent fifth edition - a fact recently pointed out by Dr. C. Ward
Kischer2, a professor of human embryology for over 30 years, who along with
others have rejected the scientific validity of this term.3
What is true in the fetal personhood arguments is true in medical and scientific
educational text books. The term "pre-embryo" is based on incorrect science and
should not be used. Unfortunately, as Dr. Kischer has also pointed out, the
erroneous term "pre-embryo" has also been incorporated in the latest edition of
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Nomina Embryologicct - the international nomenclature reference text which
certainly will influence medical and embryology text books world-wide to comply
with the inclusion of this terminology - and presumably with abortion
counseling and fetal research as well.
There are no valid or sound scientific, philosophical or theological bases for the
use of a term like "pre-embryo", for its use in arguments on fetal "personhood", or
for its inclusion as a legitimate stage of human development in any article, book or
text - especially an embryological text book or official international reference for
embryological nomenclature. Nor should this scientifically erroneous term be
allowed to be used as a scientific rationale to justify the abortion of a pre-born
child, or for his or her use in fetal research. Scientific and ethical reasons then
would certainly preclude these texts from being used in any Catholic educational
or health care institutions or facilities.
It is a given that any scientific text must be updated and changed to keep up with
the rapid scientific advancements in basic knowledge. But there is a point past
which updating ends, and politicizing begins. I leave it up to the readers to
determine if that point has been passed with this text.
An examination and comparison of Moore's third and fifth editions will
indicate considerable contradictions and confusion in terminology, yet a definite
progression in the definition and use of several basic scientific terms, terms which
will ground the eventual use of the erroneous term "pre-embryo" in his fifth
edition. In turn, the use of the term "pre-embryo" in the fifth edition will ground
and scientifically justify the abortion counseling which, I want to point out, is also
blatantly incorporated in this text book. And if Moore's texts were to be referred to
by public policy makers in their considerations for the use of human subjects in
experimental research, the present OPRR regulations could be "corrected" to
allow for unfettered research on preborn human beings up to the ninth week of
embryological development. Furthermore, the conceptual precedents being
established now in the arguments on fetal "personhood" in the abortion and fetal
research issues are transferable to certain "classes" of adult human beings,
rendering them "non-persons", and therefore arguably prime candidates for their
use in basic and medical research as well. First I will turn to a comparison of these
two editions, and trace in particular the confusing etiology of the terms "preembryo", "embryo", and "pregnancy".
Evolution of the Dermition of the
Scientifically Erroneous Term "Pre-Embryo"

The term "pre-embryo" has an interesting recent history, originally used in
debates on the use of "early human embryos" in experimental medical research.
The term was actually implied as far back as 1979 by the Ethics Advisory Board to
the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare: " ... the [early]
human embryo is entitled to profound respect, but this respect does not necessarily
encompass the full legal and moral rights attributed to persons".5 In the 1984
Warnock Committee Report in Great Britain, a similar sentiment was expressed:
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"The human embryo ... is not under the present law of the United Kingdom
accorded the same status as a living child or adult, nor do we necessarily wish it to
be accorded the same status. Nevertheless, we were agreed that the [early] embryo
of the human species ought to have a special statUS."6 The debate was taken up in
Australia and the term "pre-embryo" was rejected by the 1986 Harradine
"Human Experimentation Bill".7 It was similarly rejected by several other
international commissions, e.g., the 1986 and 1989 reports of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe.8
In the United States, the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society
claimed in its 1986 special report that early events in mammalian development
concern, above all, the formation of extraembryonic - rather than embryonic
-structures. "This means that the zygote, cleavage and early blastocyst stages
should be regarded as preembryonic rather than embryonic."9 This theme, that
there is a significant developmental structural (and therefore moral) difference
between the "extraembryonic" and the "embryonic" membranes of the "early"
human embryo, was echoed by several members of the Ethics Committee of the
American Fertility Society. Howard Jones, a pioneer in infertility "therapy" and in
vitro fertilization clinics, argued: "While the embryoblast segregates and is
recognizable toward the end of [preimplantation], it consists of only a few cells,
which are the rudiment of the subsequent embryo."10 Another member, John
Robertson II , uses the same rationale in the legal arena to argue for "brain-birth".
He often quotes full pages from the work of another member of the Ethics
Committee of the American Fertility Society, Clifford Grobstein,12 who is also
involved in in vitro fertilization studies, and whose specialty is amphibian
embryology (not human embryology). Yet another member of the Ethics
Committee of the American Fertility Society, Richard McCormick, S.J., in his
own arguments about the "moral" status of the human "preembryo", quotes from
Grobstein's "embryology", as well as from "an unpublished study of a research
group of the Catholic Health Association entitled 'The Status and Use of the
Human Preembryo'."13 According to Grobstein and McCormick,14 "preembryos" are merely "genetic individuals" and not "developmental individuals"
yet, and therefore they are not "persons': Since they are not legitimate full-blown
"persons" yet, they do not have the moral or legal rights and protections that actual
human persons possess (and therefore one could argue that these "pre-embryos"
could be aborted, experimented with, disposed of, etc.).
As noted, the new fifth edition of Keith Moore's The Developing Human
incorporates the erroneous embryological term "pre-embryo" for the first time as a
legitimate "stage" of human development by stating: "The pre-embryonic period
of human development begins at fertilization ..." (p.37). In Chapter Eight Moore
states: "In vitro studies of cleaving human zygotes (pre-embryo) less than 5 days
old have revealed a high incidence of abnormalities." And in the same chapter he
states: "Inactivation of genes on one X chromosome in somatic cells of female
pre-embryos occurs at about the time of implantation ..." (p.l44).
Perhaps it is worth noting the source on which Moore bases his nomenclature in
his fifth edition: "The terminology in this book is based on the third edition of
Nomina Embryologica which was published as part of the sixth edition of Nomina
44
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A natomica (Warwick, 1989)".15 Yet a number of writers have argued cogently
and vigourously that the science, philosophy and theology used to ground the
term "pre-embryo" is erroneous, and therefore the ethical and legal conclusions
about the "personhood" of the early developing human being (based on that
erroneous science) are also erroneous. Why would Moore or Nomina
Embryologica suddenly use such a controversial term as "pre-embryo" now?
The term simply has no basis in fact, and has been flatly rejected by other
eminent human embryologists who refuse to use the scientifically erroneous term
in their own human embryology text books. As Kischer so succinctly noted,
human embryologists do not use or acknowledge the term "pre-embryo". For
example, O'Rahilly and Muller state quite emphatically in their human
embryology text book: "The ill-defined and inaccurate term "pre-embryo"
which includes the embryonic disk is said either to end with the appearance ofthe
primitive streak (or in the Nomina Embryological) to include neurulation. The
term is not used in this book "/6 (emphasis mine). Kischer also points out that the
term is not indexed or used in the most recent edition of Stedman's Medical
Dictionary,l7 in any of the established human embryology texts - e.g., in
Larsen'sl8 or in Patten'sl9 texts - nor in the scientific literature on human
development. As he notes, there is no such stage in human development as the
"pre-embryo", and he cautions that: "Human embryology is now in danger of
being rewritten as a stratagem statement of current socio-Iegal, but also of late,
even theological, isssues. Unless the errors are corrected now, we will be in
danger of entering a protracted period of false concepts concerning our own
development"20 (emphasis mine).
A. Ambiguity in Moore's texts
In their arguments, Grobstein and McCormick claim that the "pre-embryo"
is not a "developmentally single individual" (and therefore not yet a "person")
because, for example, in the 5-6 day old blastocyst, all of the cells of the outer
trophoblast layer are discarded after birth. Only the cells from the inner
embryoblast layer become the later fetus and adult human being. 21
Strangely, in both the third and the fifth editions of Moore's texts, such
scientific statements about the blastocyst are made by Moore in the early chapters
of the texts. But in other later chapters of both texts, Moore bluntly contradicts
those scientific statements, and thus in effect contradicts any supposed claims that
could be made about "pre-embryos" and "personhood". These scientific
contradictions are confusing. For example, in the early chapters of both texts he
states:
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Third Edition

Fifth Edition

During stage 3 of development (about four
days), cavities appear inside the compact
mass of cells forming the morula, and fluid
soon passes into these cavities from the
uterine cavity. As the fluid increases, it
separates the celIs into two parts: (1) an outer
cell layer, the trophoblast... which gives rise
to part of the placenta, and (2) a group of
centralIy located celIs, known as the inner ceII
mass (or embryoblast), which gives rise to
the embryo. (p. 33; also in summary, p. 37)

Shortly after the morula enters the uterus
(about four days after fertilization), spaces
appear between the central blastomeres of the
morula. Fluid soon passes through the zona
peIlucida into these spaces from the uterine
cavity. As the fluid increases, it separates the
blastomeres into two parts: (1) a thin outer
ceII layer (or "mass") calIed the trophoblast. .
. which gives rise to part ofthe placenta, and
(2) a group of centralIy located blastomeres,
known as the inner ceII mass (or embryoblast),
which gives rise to the embryo. (p. 35; also
in summary, p. 38)

[In Figure depicting the cleavage of the zygote
and the formation of the blastocyst] (p. 34)
NOT MENTIONED

[In Figure depicting cleavage of the zygote
and formation of the blastocyst]: The inner
ceIl mass, or embryoblast, gives rise to the
tissues and organs of the embryo. (p. 34)

NOT MENTIONED

[formulation of the morula] Compaction
permits greater ceIl-to-ceIl interaction and is a
prerequisite for segregation of the internal
celIs that form the embryoblast or inner ceII
mass of the blastocyst. (p. 33)

The strong implication here is that there is a clear separation between the inner
and outer cell layers. The cells from the outer trophoblast layer are essentially
non-embryonic, and in fact are all discarded after birth as placental membranes,
etc. Only those cells from the inner layer, i.e., the embryoblast, actually really ever
become or make up the cells, tissues and organs of the later embryo, fetus and
adult human being. The philosophical (and theological) implication that
Grobstein and McCormick want to draw is that because of this early strict
separation and eventual separate and different "ontological" destinations and
fates, there is as yet no "developmental" individual present (and therefore no
"person"). The "pre-embryo", then, is to be considered as a "pre-person".
However, in Chapter 7 (in both editioQs), i.e. "The Fetal Membranes and
Placenta", Moore contradicts his own earlier scientific statements about the
relation between the inner and outer cell layers, and whether or not, in fact, both
cell layers intermingle from the beginning, and both cell layers are represented
later in the embryo, fetus and the adult human being:
Third Edition

Fifth Edition

During stage 5 of development (7 -12 days), as
the blastocyst is implanting, early differentiation of the inner cell mass occurs. A
flattened layer of celIs, the hypoblast
(primitive endoderm), appears on the surface
of the inner ceII mass facing the blastocyst
cavity at about seven days ... Recent evidence
indicates that the hypoblast is probably
displaced to extraembryonic regions. (p. 33)

At about 7 days, a flattened layer of cells
calIed the hypoblast (primitive endoderm)
appears on the surface of the inner ceII mass
facing the blastocyst cavity . . . [NO
DISCUSSION OF ITS DISPLACEMENT]
(p. 36)
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Cells, probably from the hypoblast, give rise
to a layer ofloosely arranged tissue, called the
extraembryonic mesoderm, around the
amnion and primary yolk sac... [footnotes
1,2] The origin of the exocoelomic membrane
in the human embryo is thought to be derived
from the hypoblast . .. From studies in the
rhesus monkey, there is evidence for the
formation of extraembryonic mesoderm from
the hypoblast. (p. 42)
The chorion, the amnion, the yolk sac and the
allantois constitute the embryonic or fetal
membranes. These membranes develop from
the zygote but do not form parts of the
embryo, with the exception of portions of the
yolk sac and allantois. The dorsal part of the
yolk sac is incorporated into the embryo as
the primordium of the primitive gut ... The
allantois is represented in the adult as a fibrous
cord, the median umbilical ligament, which
extends from the apex of the urinary bladder
to the umbilicus. (p. III)

The chorion, the amnion, the yolk sac and the
allantois constitute the embryonic or fetal
membranes. These membranes develop from
the zygote but do not form parts of the
embryo, with the exception of portions of the
yolk sac and allantois. The dorsal part of the
yolk sac is incorporated into the embryo as
the primordium gut . . . The allantois is
represented in the adult as a fibrous cord, the
median umbilical ligament, which extends
from the apex of the urinary bladder to the
umbilicus. (p. 113)

These statements from the later chapters are a clear and direct contradiction of
his own statements in the earlier chapters. Moore can't have it both ways.
Scientifically and factually, either all of the cells of the trophoblast layer are
discarded after birth, or they aren't. Again, some parts of his text imply a black
and white separation of the two cell layers: other parts of his text indicate an
intrinsic intermingling between the two layers. Scientifically and factually, either
there is absolutely no intermingling of the cells of the two layers, or there is. Aside
from the confusion these contradictions cause on the purely scientific level,
different possible philosophical conclusions on "personhood" follow from these
contradictiory scientific claims. And different conclusions on ethical and legal
rights and protections follow from these contradictory philosophical definitions
of "personhood".
The stakes surrounding these "personhood" arguments are, after all, rather
high for preborn human beings. If there is no such thing as an absolute separation;
if there is always an intermingling of and communication between the two cell
layers: if throughout all of human embryological development the two cell layers
and the cells, tissues and organs which are produced from them intermingle; then
individuality - both genetic and developmental - is present from fertilization on,
and therefore so is "personhood". On the other hand, if Moore, Grobstein and
McCormick are scientifically correct, if there is no continuum of development,
and therefore no human "person" yet present in this 5-6 day old human
blastocyst (even assuming that the argument is a valid one), what is wrong, then,
with using them in destructive experimental basic and medical research?
Couldn't one also scientifically and ethically rationalize any type of abortion,
including the use of the "morning after" pill, or French RU486 abortion pill since what is being aborted is really a "non-person", I.e., a "pre-embryo"?
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But the stakes in these "personhood" arguments are just as high for adult human
beings as well. Consider that many of the positions for abortion and fetal research
argue that these early developing human beings are not persons because they do
not exercise "rational attributes"22 (e.g., self-awareness, self-consciousness,
awareness of the world around one, etc.) or have advanced levels of "sentience"23
(the ability to feel pain and pleasure). Since empirically we know that the actual
exercising of "rational attributes" and the actual capacity for full "sentience" are
not present until well after birth24, these same writers argue, therefore, that
infanticide of normal healthy infants and young children is ethically permissible.
Consider, now, that such "conceptual tools" (i.e. redefinitions) would also allow
one to conclude logically that certain classes of adult human beings who also do
not exercise "rational attributes" or "sentience" would also not be "persons", e.g.:
patients with Alzheimer's and Parkinson's diseases, the mentally ill, the mentally
retarded, the comatose, drug addicts, alcoholics, stroke victims and parapelegics,
etc. If they are not "persons", then they will also not be entitled to ethical or legal
protections. Couldn't one also logically argue then, that these human adults can be
terminated or used in experimental research - if the "proportionate" need were to
arise?
These "redefinitions" of "personhood" are nothing less than politically correct
or "new age" criteria for "quality oflife" decisions. They seem to be creeping up all
over the place, in many different fields - crossing over from the issues about
abortion and fetal research into issues concerning adult human beings. That is, the
"conceptual precedents" which are being set in the issues of abortion and fetal
research can be transferred to other areas involving adult human beings, e.g., the
role that "personhood" plays in the debates about cortical brain-death, organ
transplantation, the withholding and withdrawal of medical treatments, allocation
of scarce resources, euthanasia, and any informed consent issues (e.g., living will,
informed consent for medical treatment or to take part in experimental or
therapeutic medical research, etc.). Whether or not one is politically correct about
abortion and fetal research, it would seem prudent to firmly focus our attention on
these "redefinitions" of "priesthood" which could be applied to adult human
beings as well.
B. Shifting definitions of related scientific tenns
A comparison of several of the basic definitions related to the terrns "preembryo" and "abortion" that Moore uses in the third and fifth editions will
demonstrate considerable contradiction and confusion. These shifting definitions
would subtly support his inclusion of the erroneous term "pre-embryo" in that
later edition. Once the early human embryo is relegated to a non-person, i.e., a
"pre-embryo", then it is logical to give the sort of abortion counseling which is also
found in the text.
In comparing the two editions, an attempt will be made to determine during
which time period this supposed "pre-embryo" might exist, as well as when the
"embryo" begins to exist. In analyzing these texts, there seems to be a subtle effort
to dissociate and eliminate from the fifth edition any terminology which would
indicate an integral relationship between the developing human before the

48

Linacre Quarterly

j

embryonic period, and the developing human after the embryonic period.
Additionally, it is practically impOssible to determine from these texts exactly
when the "embryo" itself actually begins. Even a look at the differences in the titles
of the various chapters in the Table of Contents is instructive.
Third Edition

Fifth Edition

Table of Contents (pp. ix-x)
Chapter One: Introduction
Chapter Two: Beginning of Human
Development
(first week)
Chapter Three: Formation of the Bilaminar
Embryo
(second week)
Chapter Four: Formation of the Trilaminar
Embryo
(third week)
Chapter Five: The Embryonic Period
(four to eight weeks)
Chapter Six: The Fetal Period
(from the ninth week to birth)

Table of Contents (pp. vii-viii)
Chapter One: Introduction
Chapter Two: The Beginning of Human
Development
(first week)
Chapter Three: Formation of the Bilaminar
Embryonic Disk:
(second week)
Chapter Four: Formation of the Human
Embryo
(third week)
Chapter Five: Development of Tissues,
Organs and Body Form
(four to eight weeks)
Chapter Six: The Fetal Period
(from ninth week to birth)

Note that in the third edition, the clear unambiguous term "embryo" is used in
both the second and third weeks. That is, in chapter three the subject is the
bllaminar embryo; in chapter four the subject is the tnlaminar embryo. However,
in the fifth edition, the clear unambiguous term "embryo" is not used until chapter
four which concerns the third week only, where the subject is the formation of the
"human embryo". Note also that the "embryonic period" is from 4-8 weeks in the
third edition; the fifth does not mention the "embryonic period" at all.
In reference to the fifth edition, does this mean that before three weeks (21 days)
there is no embryo - i.e., a "pre-embryo"? And in reference to the third edition,
how can the embryonic period be from 4-8 weeks, when it has already begun at 2
(or 3) weeks? Why doesn't the "embryonic period" start when the embryo starts
-at 2 (or 3) weeks? Would the "pre-embryo", then, be from fertilization to 2
weeks, 3 weeks or up to the beginning of the 4th week (28 days)? So far the
candidates for the "pre-embryo" period are 2 weeks (14 days), 3 weeks (21 days)
or 4 weeks (28 days). If what is before the 4th week is not an embryo, but is a
"pre-embryo", then would abortion and fetal research be permissible up to the 4th
week? This would also mark the "pre-embryo" period much later than the
implantation stage (5-6 days) or the 14-day stage which several writers claim is the
biological marker event of "personhood". When precisely, then, is the "embryonic
period"?
Third Edition
Introduction (p. I)
Prenatal Period ... Note that the most striking
advances in development occur during the first
eight weeks, in which the embryonic period is
included.
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Fifth Edition
Introduction (p. I)
Prenatal Period . . . Study of these timetables
reveals that the most striking advances in
development occur during the third to eighth
weeks, which is known as the embryonic
period.
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Thus the third edition implies that the "embryonic period" is included in the first 8
weeks, but not necessarily from the stage of fertilization. The fifth edition states
that the "embryonic period" extends from the 3rd to the 8th week - which
contradicts the third edition's claim of 4-8 weeks. This, again, would allow for a
"pre-embryo" either from the stage offertilization to the 3rd week (21 days) in the
fifth edition - or to the 4th week (28 days) in the third edition. Which is it? And
when does an embryo begin? Either sometime during the first 8 weeks; or at the
third week (21 days)?
Even the definition of the term "embryology" - the subject matter of these text
books - is confusing. In Moore's own words:
Third Edition

Fifth Edition

Scope or Embryology (p. 7)

Scope or Embryology (p. 7)

The term embryology can be misleading;
literally, it means the study of an embryo
(second to eighth weeks, inclusive). However,
embryology refers to the study of both the
embryo and the fetus, that is, the study of
prenatal development.

Embryology literally means the study of
embryos (third to eighth weeks, inclusive);
however, the term generally refers to prenatal
development, i.e., the study of both embryos
and fetuses ...

Here we have the third edition clearly stating that an embryo exists from 2-8
weeks (14-56 days); and the fifth edition stating that an embryo exists from 3-8
weeks (21-56 days). And in both editions, "embryology" is defined as a science
which only studies embryos and fetuses - which then would not include the
"developing human" from the stage offertilization to 2,3 or 4 weeks (depending
on the page or edition) - i.e., a "pre-embryo"! Aside from this contradictory and
confusing scientific account of "the developing human", what science, then, would
have as its subject matter "the developing human" from the stage of fertilization to
the stage of "embryo"? Is there a "new science" which would have as its subject
matter the study of the "pre-embryo" only? Is this a new classification of the
sciences?
Thus, there seems to be a distancing between the stages of fertilization and the
embryonic period (i.e., a "pre-embryo" stage) in the fifth edition. There is also the
surprising claim that the embryo itself does not begin until the third, or fourth,
week - i.e. 21-28 days - a period well after even the 14-day stage of "personhood"
argued for by Grobstein and McCormick (Grobstein also argues for "personhood"
at a much later time). That is, now the "pre-embryo" stage could literally extend
up to the third or fourth week, and not just up to the time of implantation (5-7
days) or the formation of the primitive streak (l4-days).
There is also a gradual shift in terminology to isolate the "embryo" from the
later "fetal" stage, as well as subtle changes in references to "abortion". For brevity,
let me simply set out some of the different definitions which are ultimately related
to the use of the term "pre-embryo" and of the term "abortion".
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Third Edition

Fifth Edition

I. "Abortion"
This term refers to the birth of an embryo or a
fetus before it is viable (mature enough to
survive outside the uterus) ...

1. "Abortion"
This term refers to the birth of an embryo or a
fetus before it is viable (capable of living
outside the uterus). Threatened abortion is a
common complication in about 25% of
clinically apparent pregnancies. Despite every
effort to prevent abortion, about 112 of these
pregnancies ultimately abort.

All terminations of pregnancy that occur
before 20 weeks are called abortions. About
15% of all recognized pregnancies end in
spontaneous abortions (ones that naturally
occur), usually during the first 12 weeks. Legal
induced abortions are brought on purposefully
usually by suction curettage (evacuation of the
embryo and its membranes from the uterus).

All terminations of pregnancy that occur
naturally or are induced before 20 weeks are
abortions. A complete abortion is one in
which all the products of conception have
been expelled from the uterus. About 15% of
all recognized pregnancies end in spontaneous
abortions (i.e., they occur naturally), usually
during the first 12 weeks. Legally induced
abortions, often called elective abortions, are
usually produced by suction curettage (evacuation of the embryo and its membranes from
the uterus). Some abortions are induced
because of the mother's poor health or to
prevent the birth of a severely malformed child
(e.g., one without most of its brain).

If the term "abortion" applies only to the terminations of pregnancies up to 20

weeks, does that mean that the terminations of pregnancies after 20 weeks are not
to be classified as "abortions"? What are they to be classified as? And if the term
"abortion" applies only to the birth of an embryo (or a fetus), does that mean that it
would not be applied to the termination of a "whatever" that comes before the
"embryo" stage? In the third edition, the first part of the reference applies the term
"abortion" to all terminations of pregnancy that occur before 20 weeks, which
would imply that the termination of a fetus would also be considered an abortion.
In the latter part of the reference, the term applies only to the embryo, and not to
the fetus as well. The same is true for the fifth edition. Thus the latter parts of the
definitions of the term "abortion" would not refer to either the so-called "preembryo" or to the fetus! Also, note the fifth edition adding reasons for induced
abortions, e.g., the birth of a severely malformed child [such as an anencephalic
child].
2. "Abortus"

2. "Abortus"

This term describes any product or ail
products of an abortion. An embryo or a nonviable fetus and its membranes weighing less
than 500 grams is called an abortus.

This term refers to the products of an abortion
(i.e., the embryo/fetus and its associated
membranes, such as the amnion and chorionic
sac). An embryo or nonviable fetus and its
membranes weighing less than 500 grams is
called an abortus, but often one refers to them
as aborted embryos or fetuses.

The term "abortus", like the term "abortion", does not refer to a so-called
"pre-embryo" either. It does still refer to both embryos and fetuses in both editions.
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But when the above term "abortion" refers only to an embryo (and not also to a
fetus), then the term "abortus" could not refer to the fetus as well. Thus, if one
were going by the latter part of the definition of "abortion", if a fetus were to be
terminated, the fetus would not be referred to as an "abortus". Thus, again, the
so-called "pre-embryo" is left out of the definition of the term "abortus"; and the
fetus could be left out of the term "abortus" if one wanted to use the latter
terminology of "abortion".
Note also that the fifth edition now includes a reference to the "associated
membranes" as inclusive of the amnion and the chorionic sac. As noted earlier,
Moore was contradictory in his earlier and later chapters about the.intermingling
of the two cell layers of the blastocyst. In his earlier chapters he stated that all of
the cells of the trophoblast layer are discarded after birth as the placental
membranes, etc. In his later chapters he stated that this was true with the
exception of cells from the yolk sac and allantois - cells derived from the
trophoblast, both of which he traces to the later embryo, fetus and adult human
being. In this present statement here he adds a reference to "membranes" which
are part of the abortus - but neglects to mention these two cell types of the
trophoblast which are later incorporated into the embryo, fetus and adult. The
attention in this fifth edition to these membranes which were of such interest and
importance to Grobstein and McCormick is interesting enough. His failure to
mention the yolk sac and the allantois, along with the amnion and the chorionic
sac, is disingenuous at best.
3. "Zygote"
This cell results from fertilization of an oocyte, or ovum, by a sperm, or spermatozoon,
and is the beginning of a human being.

3. "Zygote"
This cell results from fertilization of an oocyte
by a sperm. A zygote is the beginning of a new
human being.

At least Moore still acknowledges here that the zygote is the beginning of a
"developing human being". The questions for some (e.g., Grobstein and
McCormick) is whether or not it is also a human "person". It could also be very
confusing for Moore to use the simplistic term "oocyte". There are primary and
secondary "oocytes", and ova - all very different terms depicting different stages
during oogenesis and fertilization. Since a primary oocyte has not proceeded
through the first meiotic division (which won't happen until after puberty) and
still contains 46 chromosomes (instead of 23 chromosomes), it cannot yet be
fertilized by a sperm, and so they would not be usable yet in in vitro "therapy".
Given the studies proposed in Scotland to use the "eggs" from aborted female
fetuses in in vitro fertilization "therapies" for post-menapausal women, such a
distinction would be very critical. Those "aborted eggs" cannot be fertilized,
because each of them still contains 46 chromosomes.
4. "Blastocyst"
After the morula enters the uterus, a cavity
develops inside it and fills with fluid; this
converts the morula into a blastocyst.
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4. "Blastocyst"
After the morula enters the uterus from the
uterine tube, a fluid-filled cavity develops inside it; this converts the morula into a blastocyst. Its centrally located cells called the
embryoblast or inner cell mass, will form the
embryo.

Linacre Quarterly

Without repeating, the fifth edition again seems to be focusing on the issue argued
by Grobstein and McCormick - i.e., that only the cells from the embryoblast
(inner cell layer) of the blastocyst will form the embryo - not the cells from the
trophoblast layer. Yet, as already indicated, Moore contradicts those claims in his
later chapters.
5. "Embryo"

5. "Embryo"

This term refers to the developing human
during the early stages of development. The
term is usually not used until the second week,
after the embryonic disc forms . .. The
embryonic period extends until the end of the
eighth week, by which time all major
structures are present.

This term refers to the developing human
during its early stages of development. The
term is not usually used until the middle ofthe
second week. The embryonic period extends
to the end of the eighth week, at which time
the beginnings of all major structures are
present.

Here we have the embryo begnning both the "second" week, and the "middle of
the second" week. The third edition contradicts its own Table of Contents in
which the "embryonic period" is defined as from four to eight weeks. The fifth
edition contradicts its own previous claim of 3 weeks. Both editions contradict
each other.
- next, "Fetus"
[in the Table of Contents, this stage
extends from the ninth week to birth]
7. "Conceptus"
This term refers to the EMBRYO (OR
FETUS) and its membranes, the products of
conception. It includes all structures that
develop from the zygote, both embryonic and
extraembryonic. Hence it includes not only
the EMBRYO OR FETUS, but also the
embryonic or fetal membranes.

6. "Conceptus"
This term refers to the EMBRYO and its
membranes. i.e., the i.e., products of conception
or fertilization. It includes all structures that
develop from the zygote, both embryonic and
extraembryonic. Hence it includes the
EMBRYO as well as the fetal part of the
placenta and its associated membranes, e.g.,
the amnion and chorionic sac ...
7. - "Fetus"
[In the Table of Contents, this stage
extends from the ninth week to birth]

Note now that while in the third edition the term "conceptus" refers to the
embryo and fetus, in the fifth edition it refers only to the embryo, and not also to
the fetus. Note also the same elaboration of the placenta and its associated
membranes (the amnion and chorionic sac) - with no mention of the yolk sac and
the allantois. The shift in the ordering of the term "fetus" will be addressed later.
If we are not totally confused yet as to what a "pre-embryo", an "embryo" or a
"conceptus" is - or when each of these begins to form, or what an "abortion" is
(and exactly what it is that is being aborted), consider the end of Chapter One (p.
12), where (as in every chapter) there is a set of "clinically oriented problems" or
"questions" prepared for the bright inquiring medical or graduate biology
student.
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Third Edition
Question 3: Differentiate between the terms
conceptus and abortus.
Answer (p. 446): The term "conceptus" is
used when referring to an embryo or a fetus
and its membranes, i.e., the products of
conception. The term "abortus" refers to any
product or all products of an abortion, e.g.,
the embryo (or part of it) and/or its fetal
membranes and placenta (or parts of them).

Fifth Edition
Question 3: How does a conceptus differ from
an "ab<;lrtus"?
Answer (p. 458): The term "conceptus" is
used when referring to an embryo and its
membranes, i.e., the products of conception.
The term "abortus" refers to any products or
all products of an abortion, e.g., the embryo
(or part of it) and/or its membranes and
placenta (or parts of them). An abortion,
therefore is an aborted conceptus.

Now, this is really confusing. One has to wonder how these bright inquiring
medical or graduate biology students ever study for their exams. First of all,
neither the third edition nor the fifth edition refer to a so-called "pre-embryo", or
whatever comes before the embryo (whenever that is). Thus a "pre-embryo" is
not aborted, nor is it called an abortus or a conceptus. Second, in the fifth edition,
now an "abortus" is an aborted "conceptus", and an aborted "conceptus" is only
an embryo! That is, since a fetus is not included in the definition of a "conceptus",
the term "abortus" does not apply to an abortion of a fetus either. This is why, in
the listing of these terms, the third edition lists the term "fetus" before the term
"conceptus", while in the fifth edition, the term "fetus" is listed after the term
"conceptus"! For some reason the latter part of the term "abortion", and the
terms "abortus" and "conceptus" in the fifth edition do not refer to the fetus.
Now a fetus cannot be referred to as having been aborted, or referred to as an
abortus or a conceptus. If it is aborted, then what is it to be referred to as? And
how could it not be considered a conceptus (i.e., the product of conception)? If it
is not the product of conception, then what is it the product of? I suppose that if
IVF is ever really perfected, neither the act of intercourse nor the mother's womb
would be necessary, and the fetus would truly be considered the "product of
IVF". Perhaps that could be the "subject matter" of the "new science" that the
present science of embryology (by definition) does not study - along with the
study of the "pre-embryo". "Embryology", then would really only study
"embryos" -period. Eventually I suppose we could do away with all of the
above related terms, since there would technically be nothing to which the terms
"abortion", "abortus" or "conceptus" could refer - since no women would have
to be "pregnant". Indeed, I am sure that the work on the "artificial placenta" will
ensure that. What a brave new world!
Second, in the main text of the third edition, there is no difference between a
"conceptus" and an "abortus"; and both terms refer to both an embryo or a fetus.
Yet in this "clinically oriented question", a "conceptus" still refers to both an
embryo and a fetus; but an "abortus" now refers only to an embryo. Thus the
third edition is contradicting its own definitions. In the main text of the fifth
edition, the term "conceptus" refers only to the embryo, and the term "abortus"
refers to both the embryo and the fetus. Yet in its "clinically oriented question",
both terms refer only to the embryo and not to the fetus. Part of our confusion
may be resolved, however, when we get to the "study" questions at the end of
Chapter Two. The following question and answer do not appear in the third
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edition; only in the fifth edition:
Question 5 (p. 38): A young woman who feared that she might be pregnant asked about the
so-called "morning after pills" . . . What would you tell her? Would termination of such an early
pregnancy be considered an abortion?
Answer 5 (p. 458): Postcoital birth control pills ... will usually prevent implantation of the
blastocyst . . . Pregnancy occurs but the blastocyst does not implant. The term abortion would not
be applied to such an early termination of pregnancy.

"The term abortion would not be applied to such an early termination of
pregnancy"! And so, presumably, one can terminate "it" and still not have had an
abortion! How is this explainable? Is it that, unless the embryo (or "pre-embryo")
has implanted, then the woman is not yet "pregnant"? It would seem not, since
the answer states "such an early termination of pregnancy". Thus, presumably
Moore acknowledges, at least, that the woman is pregnant. No, it would seem
that it is because the woman's stage of pregnancy is "early". But what does
"early" have to do with it? I would argue that just as Grobstein and McCormick
use the term "pre-embryo" in order to justify experimentation on the early
blastocyst (and actually until the 14-day stage), here Moore has set up the terms
with such confusion, and incorporated in this edition the erroneous term "preembryo", in order to justify the termination of the "early developing human
being" without calling it "abortion". Now it is scientifically justifiable to use the
"morning after pills" - which Moore admits does not prevent fertilization, but
only implantation - to eliminate what is basically, after all, only a "pre-embryo"
-i.e., a non-person - if one is "fearful" that one is experiencing an "early"
pregnancy! The term "pre-embryo", then, would also justify the use ofthe French
pill RU-486! The term would also justify the use ofthese early developing human
beings in experimental research.
So, amid this confusion of contradictory and inconsistent definitions and
terms, the concrete result is that what most of us refer to as "abortion" is
scientifically justified. "Abortion" during "early pregnancy" simply disappears. I
suppose such an "early pregnancy" might be termed a 'pre-pregnancy"! And
with these "redefinitions" goes the guilt, regrets, and moral rebukes that women
may fear from the termination ofthese "early" pregnancies. Note that "abortion"
of a fetus also disappears! The term "abortion" no longer can be referred to the
termination of a fetus; it will be restricted to the embryo only. Perhaps the
termination of a fetus will be called a "post-pregnancy". Perhaps we also need to
clarify exactly what is meant by the term "pregnancy". What is a "pregnancy"?
Does it only have reference to the woman, and not to what she is pregnant with?
How is the critical term "pregnancy." defined?

"Pregnancy": the Case of the Missing Definition
It would seem at this point that a relevant "clinically orientated question" to be
addressed to the bright inquiring medical and graduate biology students is: "How
would you define 'pregnancy"'? If before implantation (5-6 days) - (or 2,3 or 4
weeks) - there is only a "pre-embryo", and therefore a "pre-pregnancy", how
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then does one define a "pregnancy"? After all, abortion is commonly understood
as the termination of a pregnancy - right? Well, then, scientifically speaking, just
when does a woman become "pregnant"?
Again Moore is extremely confusing and contradictory. In fact, a thorough
search of both the third and the fifth editions of Moore's text books reveal no
formal definition of the term "pregnancy"! Imagine, an embryology text book,
replete with virtually thousands of formal definitions about the developing
human and the female uterus ... Imagine, a counsel to students that the term
"abortion" would not apply to such as "early termination of pregnancy" - or to
the termination of a fetus either, for that matter - and no definition of
"pregnancy"! Even an attempt to decipher one amid the various contexts in
which the term is used is, once again, contradictory and confusing. Indeed, both
fertilization and implantation (or later) are implied:
Third Edition
NOT MENTIONED

Fifth Edition
Within 24-48 hours after fertilization an
immunosuppresant protein, known as the
early pregnancy factor (EPF), appears in the
maternal serum. EPF forms the basis of
pregnancy tests during the first week of
development (p. 32)

About 15% of all zygotes result in detectable
spontaneous abortion, but this estimate is
undoubtedly low because the loss of zygotes
during the first week is thought to be high.
The actual rate is unkown because the women
do not know they are pregnant at this early
stage. (p. 36)

At least 15% of zygotes die and blastocysts
abort ... Another 30% of women abort very
early, unaware that they were pregnant (p.
36)

It would seem here that "pregnancy" begins at fertilization. The pregnancy tests
imply the detection of pregnancy during the first week. The terms "zygote" and
"blastocyst" are used which also indicate 1-7 days. Note also the reference that
zygotes and blastocysts "abort" during this earliest of early stages. Yet recall the
abortion counseling, i.e., the term "abortion" would not apply to such an "early"
stage of pregnancy. Confusing?
NOT MENTIONED

IBID
(p. 46-48)

IBID
(p. 48)
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Enough hCG is produced by the syncytiotrophoblast at the end of the second week to
give a positive pregnancy test even though the
woman is probably unaware she is pregnant.
(p.40)
Implantation of the blastocyst usually occurs
in the endometrium of the uterus. If
implantation occurs elsewhere, a misplaced
or ectopic pregnancy results. (p. 43)
Intrauterine pregnancy can be detected by
highly sensitive radioimmune assays of hCG
as early as the end of the second week ... The
blastocyst may implant outside the uterus.
These implantations are referred to as ectopic
pregnancies. (p. 46)
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Here pregnancy is detectable by the end of the second week. And the woman is
pregnant at least by the time of implantation (5-7 days).
Third Edition

Fifth Edition

The administration of relatively large doses of
estrogen (morning-after pills) for several days
after sexual intercourse will prevent pregnancy
by inhibiting implantation of the blastocyst
that may develop. (p. 49)

The administration of relatively large doses of
estrogen ("morning-after pills) for 5 days,
beginning 72 hours after sexual intercourse,
will usually prevent pregnancy by inhibiting
implantation of the blastocyst (pp. 49-50)

Relatively simple and rapid tests are now
available for detecting pregnancy as early as
the third week. These tests depend on the
presence of human chorionic gonadotropin
(hCG), a honnone produced by the trophoblast
and excreted in the mother's urine . . . There is
no absolute sign of pregnancy during the early
weeks because a gravid (pregnant) uterus may
be mimicked by several other conditions. (p.
53)

Relatively simple and rapid tests are now
available for detecting pregnancy. Most tests
depend on the presence of an early pregnancy
factor (EPF) in the maternal serum .. . and
human chorionic gonadotropin (hCG), . .. (p.
53)

Does "will prevent pregnancy by inhibiting implantation" mean that unless
implantation has taken place a woman is not pregnant and that if implantation
does take then she is pregnant? The reference to a "gravid (pregnant) uterus"
would seem to imply this also. This would contradict the first of these references,
which imply strongly that a woman is pregnant from fertilization on.
Almost all abortions during the first three
weeks occur spontaneously; that is, they are
not induced. The frequency of early abortions
is difficult to establish because they often
occur before the woman is aware she is
pregnant. (p. 49)

Most abortions of embryos during the first
three weeks occur spontaneously; i.e., they are
not induced . . . The frequency of early
abortions is difficult to establish because they
often occur before women are aware thatthey
are pregnant. (p. 49)

The third edition acknowledges that "early" abortions may occur during the first
three weeks, a contradiction of the fifth edition's abortion counseling about
"early pregnancies". The fifth edition only refers now to abortions of embryos
during the first three weeks, implying that the terms of "zygote" and "blastocyst"
would not be considered "abortions". Yet simultaneously it uses the term "early
abortions" during this 3 week period "before women are aware they are
pregnant". One is still hopelessly confused as to exactly when "pregnancy"
begins, how it is defined, and what it is a woman is pregnant with.
Third Edition

Question 2: A 25-year old woman with a
history of regular menstrual cycles five days
was overdue on menses. Owing to her mental
condition and the undesirability of a possible
pregnancy, the doctor decided to do a
"menstrual extraction", or uterine evacuation.
The tissue removed was examined for
evidence of a pregnancy. What findings
would indicate an early pregnancy? How old
would the products of concception be? (p. 68)
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Third Edition
Answer 2: The presence of embryonic and/ or
chorionic tissue in the endometrial remnants
would be an absolute sign of pregnancy, but
this tissue would be very difficult to find at
such an early stage of pregnancy. By five days
after the expected menses, i.e., about five
weeks after the last menstrual period, the
embryo would be in the third week of its
development. (p. 448)

Fifth Edition

IBID, with the addition of: the blastocyst
would be about 2 mm in diameter. (p. 459)

Here, in the third edition an absolute sign of pregnancy corresponds with a
3-week embryo whicn has implanted. Also, in the fifth edition, the term
"blastocyst" is added. However, a blastocyst (5-7 days) predates an embryo (2,3
or 4 weeks) and has not necessarily implanted as yet. Thus there could be no
"embryonic and! or chorionic tissue" present. Besides, I thought a blastocyst was
really a "pre-embryo", and therefore would be no abortion, no abortus, no
conceptus, and no pregnancy! Really confusing. But to continue.
Question 2: A woman who had been raped
during her fertile period was given large doses
of estrogen ... «DES) twice daily for five
days) to interupt a possible pregnancy. If she
happened to be pregnant, what do you think
would be the mechanism of action of the
DES? What do laypeople call this type of
treatment? (p. 5 I )

A woman who was sexually assaulted during
her fertile period was given large doses of
estrogen twice daily for five days to interrupt a
possible pregnancy. If fertilization had
occured, what do you think would be the
mechanism of action of this hormone? What
do laypeople call this type of medical
treatment? Is this what the media refer to as
the "abortion pill''? If not explain the method
of action of this pill. How early can a
pregnancy be detected? (p. 50)

Answer 2: DES appears to affect the
endometrium by rendering it unsuitable for
implantation, a process regulated by a delicate
balance between estrogen and progestrone.
The large dose of estrogen given to the patient
upset this balance. Progesterone makes the
endometrium grow thick and succulent so
that the blastocyst may become embedded
and be nourished adequately .. DES pills are
referred to as "morning after pills" by
laypeople. (p. 447)

. .. (DES) appears to affect the endometrium
by rendering it unsuitable for implantation, a
process that is regulated by a delicate balance
between estrogen and progesterone. The large
doses of estrogen given to the patient upset
this balance. Progesterone makes the endometrium grow thick and succulent so that the
blastocyst may become embedded and be
nourished adequately. DES pills are referred
to as "morning after pills" by laypeople.
When the media refer to the "abortion pill"
they are usually referring to RU486. This
drug, developed in France, also interferes
with implantation of the blastocyst. It blocks
the production of progesterone. Its use has not
been authorized in North America (at the
time of this writing). A pregnancy can be
detected at the end of the second week after
fertilization using highly sensitive pregnancy
tests. Most tests depend on the presence of an
early pregnancy factor (EPF) in the maternal
serum. (p. 459).
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In the third edition does "interupt a possible pregnancy" imply that unless the
blastocyst implants the woman is not pregnant? Yet in the fifth edition a
distinction is made between fertilization having occured and a possible
pregnancy! This edition also adds the latest information on drug use.
Interestingly, the "morning after pills" are not to be properly referred to as an
abortion pill (as we have already seen) - and therefore one might take them, being
assured that one is not causing an abortion. Why the "morning after pills" would
not be referred to as abortion pills, then, has been made clear - i.e., abortion does
not refer to an "early pregnancy" - i.e., when there is only a "pre-embryo" there.
But why, then, would only RU486 be referred to as an abortion pill? The "entity"
terminated is still a "pre-embryo" and the pills also act by preventing
implantation. At least Moore should be consistent. And we still have no clue as to
when "pregnancy" begins.
Connection Between Abortion and Fetal Research
If one is not a scientist, and if one wants to know what these terms mean and
how they are defined, one would logically turn to a well-established and
respected human embryology text book. Consider a "blue-ribbon" governmental
panel, or even the new non-government independent NABER25 (started with
seed money from the American Fertility Society, whose board members include
many of the scientists, physicians, bioethicists, lawyers and other professionals
who are great proponents of abortion, IVF, fetal research, etc.) brought together
to weigh and judge the appropriate "ethical" issues and responses to the various
burgeoning issues in experimental research and "reproductive health"
(NAROL's new emphasis and new name). Where would they turn to obtain the
most reliable scientific definitions of the "entities" which are to be experimented
on for medical advancement, "reproductive health" concerns, the obtaining of
purely scientific knowledge not possible by any other means, and the greater
good of society? One very reasonable possible scientific reference source would
be Moore's text book on human embryology, especially the most recent fifth
edition. And what could they find there now? That until the fourth week, i.e., 28
days, there is really only a "pre-embryo" there - a "non-person" with no ethical or
legal protections. Consequently, not only could "early" abortions be acceptable
up to 28 days, but also unfettered experimental research would be acceptable up
to 28 days. Thus, both "pre-embryos" and "embryos" would be ethically
acceptable materials on which to experiment, with no ethical squabbles or
regulatory oversights. That should give us pause enough.
But what about the possible use of human fetuses in experimental research?
Moore has defined the fetal period from nine weeks to birth. Most human
embryology text books do. So certainly the early developing human being would
be protected from abortion and experimental research at least up to the ninth
week - right? Well, Moore has not included the fetus in his definitions of
abortion, abortus, or conceptus. No - Moore's text would not protect a fetus from
abortion! But luckily at least the present OPRR governmental regulations do
protect the fetus. A look at the present governmental OPRR regulations, and
how they define the terms "pregnancy" and "fetus" should clarify the situation
and relieve this tension.
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It is interesting to note that the definition of "pregnancy" in the O.P.R.R.
regulations on the use of human subjects in experimental research is: "the period
of time from confirmation of implantation [5-7 days] . . . until expulsion or
extraction of the fetus."26 Thus, theoretically, a woman is not even "pregnant"
from the time of fertilization until implantation. I suppose she would be
considered "pre-pregnant" with a "pre-embryo". At the present moment, then,
developing human beings up to the time of implantation are not protected from
destructive experimental research, as that definition stands in the OPRR
regulations. If the regulations were to incorporate Moore's new term of "preembryo", then it could be acceptable to use developing human beings even up to
the 28-day stage! Thus it is not only acceptable to "terminate" the "early
pregnancy" of a "pre-embryo". It could also be acceptable to use these
"terminations" in destructive experimental research. This would also apply, of
course, to the products of in vitro fertilization. Clearly, this sets the stage for
unregulated experimentation on IVF human embryos - with or without
implantation. That is, even when it is planned to implant IVF human "embryos"
(if that is what they are), if a scientist wants to experiment on them before
implantation, then there are no regulations covering such experiments (although
we will now have the expert ethical advise from NABER at our disposal).
But how do the OPRR regulations define "fetus"? A fetus is defined as: "the
product of conception from the time of implantation ... until a determination is
made, following expulsion or extraction of the fetus, that it is viable. "27 Does this
mean that the fetal stage begins at implantation? How could such a blue-ribbon
governmental panel of such experts have defined the critical term "fetus" as
beginning at implantation? Were they just being "cautious"?
Of great concern is that if "ethics panels" were to consult Moore's third or fifth
edition, a "fetus" would not exist until the ninth week, i.e., 63 days. Could this
mean that if an "ethics panel" were to square its definitions with Moore's text
book, that before nine weeks the developing human being (the "pre-fetus") could
be aborted, experimented on, or harvested for tissues and organs with no
regulations? Consider that in his fifth edition, Moore does not use the terms
"abortion", "abortus" or "conceptus" to refer to the fetus - only to the "embryo".
So presumably, to terminate a "fetus" would no more be properly defined as
"abortion" than was the termination of an "early pregnancy"! Would
"correcting" the present "outmoded" definition of "fetus" in the present federal
regulations, then, provide for an even longer period during the life of the
"developing human" that it could be experimented on - i.e., up to nine weeks
-without regulations?
Coincidentally, the optimum time to harvest fetal brain tissue is between eight
and nine weeks -just before Moore's cut-off point of nine weeks in his definition
of a "fetus"! Given the new grants to several research institutions to use fetal brain
tissue in research on Parkinson's disease, Alzheimer's disease, and several other
neurological and brain disorders, the future looks grim for "developing human
beings". What further developing "definitions" are in store for us in the future?
Who else will be scientifically defined away as "pre-persons" or "non-persons"
for the sake of basic and medical researchers? Could it be those very desperate
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adult human subjects who have Parkinson's disease, Alzheimer's disease, who are
comatose, mentally ill, parapelgic, drug addicts, etc. - i.e., those human beings
who do not exercise "rational attributes" or sufficient "sentience", and who are
therefore not human persons? What an incredible scenario! Basic and medical
researchers experimenting on two classes of human beings, neither of which are
human "persons" - with no regulations or ethical dilemmas! Their "personhood"
has been defined away! And nobody did anything about it.

Conclusion
Whether such contradictory and confusing scientific definitions of important
basic terms used in human embryology occur because of ignorance, sloppiness,
or design is debateable. Certainly the massive amounts of contradictory
definitions presented in these texts would warrant a similar analysis of many
other basic scientific and medical texts being used by professionals and students
alike. It would appear to this writer that these various key definitions are being
"ratcheted" in order to scientifically justify both abortion and fetal research. This
is the ultimate in the on-going politilization of science. And unless the errors and
inconsistences are corrected immediately, we are not only entering a protracted
period of "false concepts concerning our own development"; we are entering a
protracted period of abysmal abuse of human beings - pre-born and adult. The
stage has already been set.
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